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BANK MERGERS, BRANCH BANKING AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
IN PENNSYLVANIA *
ALMARiN PHmIT s t
Recent years have witnessed significant changes in federal policy
with respect to bank mergers and bank holding companies. Of most
importance is the shift from the view that banks were largely immune
from action under the antitrust laws 1 to the holding of the Supreme
Court that the merger provisions of the Clayton Act ' as well as the
monopolization and restraint of trade standards of the Sherman Act 3
are applicable to banks.' In addition, the Congress has been active,
passing the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,' the Bank Merger
Act of 1960 6 and the Bank Merger Act of 1966.'
These changes at the federal level have tended to obscure the sig-
nificance of the so-called "dual banking system" and the importance
of state law in determining the structure and competitiveness of banking
markets. Branch banking in any form, save for "drive-in" tellers'
windows, collections from school savings programs, etc., is prohibited
in eighteen states.' In sixteen other states, branching is permitted
within certain geographically restricted areas. The remaining sixteen
states allow statewide branching, but it is not unusual to find other
* This article is a revision of a report prepared for the Department of Banking,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for use by the Pennsylvania Banking Law Com-
mission appointed by Governor William W. Scranton, February 1964. The views
expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Department
of Banking or to the Banking Law Commission or to any members or employees of
the Department or Commission. A complementary article, Structural and Regulatory
Reform for Commercial Banking, which treats federal policy, appears in ISSUES IN
BANKING AND MONETARY ANALYSIS (Hart, Pontecorvo & Shay eds.), to be pub-
lished in 1967.
t Professor of Economics and Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1948, M.A.
1949, University of Pennsylvania. Ph.D. 1953, Harvard University.
IKAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMf IC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
42-43, 291 (1959) ; Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
589 (1949).
2 64 Stat 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
3 26 Stat 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
4 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (Sher-
man Act) ; United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Clayton
Act).
S 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1964).
6 74 Stat 129.
7 80 Stat 7.
8 FDIC ANN. REP. 45 (1960).
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restrictions which limit the freedom of banks to choose specific branch
locations.' In view of these state strictures there can be scant doubt
that state law, not federal, has had the greater impact on the functioning
of bank markets.
This article is concerned with public policies within the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania with respect to mergers among banks, de novo
branch banking 'I and bank holding companies. In addition, since both
de novo branching and branching by merger may involve the entry of
banking institutions into markets or submarkets which the branching
bank had not previously served, some comments are also made con-
cerning bank entry through new state bank chartering.
The existing legislation concerning these matters and the banking
structure which has emerged during the past several years are reviewed
in the section which follows. Attention is then given to the develop-
ment of criteria which may be used to judge the efficiency of the struc-
ture and performance of banking markets. On the basis of the latter
and on the results of a substantial and prestigious volume of recent re-
search," the final section offers policy recommendations for the
"commonweal."
BANKING STRUCTURE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Under the current Pennsylvania code,'" the Department of Bank-
ing must approve for state-chartered banks the initial corporate charter-
ing,'3 the opening for business,'4 the opening of branches, 15 the reloca-
9 For a convenient summary, see BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYS-
TEM, COMPILATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND TERRITORIAL STATUTES RELATING TO
BRANCH BANKING (1961).
10 De novo branching refers to the building of branch offices by banks, as opposed
to the buying of existing branches of other banking institutions.
" Among the better known studies are: ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETrTON
n BANKING (1954); FLECHSIG, BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFOR!ANCE
IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1965); HoRvrrz, CONCENTRATION AND ComPETrrIoN IN
NEW ENGLAND BANKING (1958); NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, BRANCH
BANKING, BANK MERGERS AND THE PuBuc INTEREST (1964); Alhadeff, A Recon-
sideration of Restrictionsr on Bank Entry, 76 Q.J. EcoN. 246 (1962); Carson &
Cootuer, The Structure of Competition in Commercial Banking in the United States,
in PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 55 (1963); Chandler, Monopolistic Elements
in Comnercial Banking, 46 J. POL ECON. 1 (1938) ; Edwards, The Banking Com-
petition Controversy, 3 NATIONAL BANKING REV. 1 (1965); Flechsig, The Effect of
Concentration on Bank Loan Rates, 20 J. FINANCE 298 (1965); Horvitz & Shull,
The Impact of Branch Banking on Bank Performance, 2 NATIONAL BANKING REV.
143 (1964) ; Motter & Carson, Bank Entry and the Pitblic Interest: A Case Study,
1 NATIONAL BANKING REv. 469 (1964); Schweiger & McGee, Chicago Banking,
34 J. BUSINESS 203 (1961); Shull & Horvitz, Branch Banking and the Structure
of Competition, 1 NATIONAL BANKING REV. 301 (1964).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 7, §§ 101-2204 (Supp. 1965).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1007 (Supp. 1965).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1010 (Supp. 1965).
15 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 905 (Supp. 1965).
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tion of banks and branches "I and the assumption by one bank of the
liabilities of another, including in the latter, bank mergers and con-
solidations." Minimum capital requirements for new banks are
$50,000 for places with population of less than 6,000, $100,000 for
populations between 6,000 and 50,000 and $200,000 for populations
over 50,000."8 The minimum capital requirements for new bank and
trust companies or trust companies are somewhat higher.' Additional
capital and surplus are required for each de novo branch outside the
city, borough or village in which the head office is located. The
amounts required range from $25,000 to $300,000 of capital and
$12,500 to $150,000 of surplus, depending again on the population of
the place in which the branch is located and the type of institution
established."0
De novo branching is permissible only in the same county in
which the principal office is located or in a county contiguous to
that county."' When the proposed branch is located outside the city,
incorporated town, borough or township in which the head office is
located, the branching bank must give written notice to all other state
banks in the county of the proposed branch.' In those cases in which
the proposed branch is in a county contiguous to the head office of the
applicant bank, the Department of Banking may, "in its discretion,"
disapprove of the branch if any state bank with its head office in that
county has indicated to the Department its good faith intention "to
establish a branch in the same city, incorporated town, borough or
township." '
Legislative criteria for the establishment of de novo branches are
that the Department find "that there is a need for banking services or
facilities such as are contemplated by the establishment of the proposed
branch and that the requirements . . . have been complied with."2 4
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 903 (Supp. 1965).
1 7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604 (Supp. 1965).
18 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1102 (Supp. 1965).
19 Ibid. For localities with populations of less than 6000, the minimum capital
for a bank and trust company or a trust company is $150,000. A minimum of $200,000
is required of such an institution located in a place with a population of between
6000 and 50,000. In all other cases, a $300,000 minimum is necessary. The popu-
lation figures are determined by the last United States census of the place in which
the institution's principal place of business is located.2 0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 906(b) (Supp. 1965).
2 1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904(b) (Supp. 1965).
22 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904(b) (iii) (Supp. 1965).
23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 905(b) (Supp. 1965). Under the new code, hearings
before the Department or before the Banking Board are left to the discretion of the
Department. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 905 (a) (Supp. 1965). Previously, the Banking
Board had authority with respect to branches outside the place in which the head
office was located.
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 905(c) (Supp. 1965).
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In addition to these, however, the Department must refer to the general
instructions for its supervision of the banking system that it "exercise
its discretionary powers" to provide for "the safe and sound conduct
of the business of institutions subject to this act," "the conservation of
their assets," "the maintenance of public confidence in them" and "the
protection of the interests of their depositors, creditors and shareholders
and of the interest of the public in the soundness and preservation of
the banking system." '
The Pennsylvania code permits mergers the effects of which do not
violate the provisions with respect to de novo branching. Thus, exist-
ing branches of both of two merging banks may be operated provided
they lie in the county or in a county contiguous to that of the head office
of the resulting bank. 6 The merger plans must be ratified by a
majority of the directors and two-thirds of the shareholders of each
institution." In its examination, the Department of Banking is in-
structed to ascertain, among other things, whether "the plan and any
modification thereof adquately protect the interests of depositors, other
creditors and shareholders" 28 and whether "the merger or consolida-
tion would be consistent with adequate and sound banking and in the
public interest." With respect to the latter, the financial history and
conditions of the merging banks, their prospects, the character of their
management, the convenience and needs of the area to be served and
the "potential effect of the merger . . . on competition" are to be con-
sidered." When the proposal is disapproved, the Department of Bank-
ing must state the reasons for its actions."0 In all instances the action
of the Department of Banking is conclusive and not subject to review
except upon broad certiorariY State action is held in abeyance until
approval or disapproval has been received from the relevant federal
agency acting under the federal Bank Merger Act.
3 2
Under the Pennsylvania Bank Holding Company Act of 1957,33
certain forms of intercorporate ownership and control of banking in-
stitutions are prohibited.34 Corporations or other forms of business
associations are prohibited from holding 25% or more of the outstand-
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 103 (Supp. 1965).
26 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904(a) (Supp. 1965).
27 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 7, § 1603(b) (ii) (Supp. 1965).
2 8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604(a) (ii) (Supp. 1965).
29 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604(a) (iv) (Supp. 1965).
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604(b) (Supp. 1965).
31 Ibid.
32 80 Stat. 7 (1966).
3 3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§851-55 (1965).
34 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §853 (1965).
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ing shares of each of two or more banks or from otherwise controlling
the election of directors of two or more banksf
5 It is unlawful for any
company to become a holding company as so defined after the effective
date of the act."
National banks are chartered through the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. 7 The same office approves of de novo branches for
national banks 3 and, under the federal Bank Merger Act, of mergers
in which the resulting bank will be nationally chartered.,
39 When the
resulting bank is to be a state-chartered member of the Federal Reserve
System, the Board of Governors must approve and, for insured, non-
member, state-chartered banks, the approval of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is required."0 With respect to both de novo
branching and branching by merger by national banks, the Comptroller
of the Currency makes approvals within the constraints of state legis-
lation pertaining to state-chartered banks. 1
A summary of the statewide changes in the banking structure
which have transpired in recent years can be gleaned from Table 1.
Over fourteen years, the total number of commercial banks has been
reduced by 357, with a total of 367 banks having been absorbed through
mergers and one bank having ceased operation without being acquired
by another. At the beginning of 1964, the number of banks in the state
was roughly 68% of the number in existence at the beginning of 1950.
Table 2 shows the changes in the number of branches operated by
commercial banks over the same period. While the number of banks
fell by 357, the number of branches increased by 867. Stated alter-
natively, the number of commercial bank offices was 1,159 in 1950, and
had risen to 1,669 by the beginning of 1964.
The reduction in number of commercial banks since the early
195 0's is substantial by virtually any criterion. In fact, the number of
bank mergers and absorptions in Pennsylvania from 1952 to 1964
exceeded by far that of any other state. It is also true, however, that
at the beginning of the period Pennsylvania had a larger number of
commercial banks than did any other state, including those states which
35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 852(b) (1965).
3 6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 853 (1965).
37 REV. STAT. §5169 (1875), 12 U.S.C. §27 (1964).
38 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964).
39 80 Stat. 7 (1966).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.; 76 Stat. 667 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 36(b) (1964).
4 2 The tables are at pp. 582-88 infra. A more complete account can be found
in P. SmrrH, BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1965).
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prohibit all forms of branching. 3 Thus, despite the 347 mergers
between 1952 and 1964, the number of banks remaining in 1964 was
larger than that for any state permitting any form of branching and
larger than that for any state except Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri
and Texas, in all of which branching is prohibited.
The reduction in number of banks has not been evenly distributed
within the state. In general, there have been large absolute and relative
reductions in the number of banks with head offices in the metropolitan
areas-the principal cities, their suburbs and immediate surrounding
counties-compared with the rest of the state. For example, Table 3
shows the number of banks by county for 1956 and 1964. The total
reduction in number of banks between these dates was 198. The reduc-
tion in twenty-two metropolitan area counties was 143 (72o) and
that in forty-five nonmetropolitan area counties was fifty-five (28%)
of this total. In other words, the metropolitan area counties had in
1964 only 69% of the number of banks in 1956 while the nonmetro-
politan area counties had 85% of the 1956 figure.4 5 Only in the north-
western area nonmetropolitan counties has the reduction in number of
banks been comparable to the metropolitan areas.
Of Pennsylvania's total of 621 banks at the beginning of 1964,
222 operated branches and 399 were unit banks. By June 30, 1964,
twelve additional unit banks had been absorbed, leaving 387 unit banks
in the state. Of the latter, 217 were in counties outside of the state's
twelve Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. In the same counties,
340 additional bank offices were operated by branch banks. A total of
ninety-three branch banks had head offices in these counties."' These
banks operated 181 branches other than their head offices within the
same counties in which head offices were located and sixty-six branches
outside of the head office county. Branch banks with head offices out-
side of metropolitan areas thus operated an average of about 3.7 offices
per bank. In contrast, the 129 branch banks with head offices within
the metropolitan areas operated 617 branches other than their head
office within the same counties in which head offices were located and
234 branches outside of the head office counties. These metropolitan
43 SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 8; BANKING MARKErS UNrr, FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, N UBsER OF COMMERCIAL -BANKS AND BRANCHE-S BY STATES (1964);
Changes in Banking Structure, 1953-1962, 49 FEn. RESERVE BuLu. 1191, 1320 (1963).
4 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDE.RA RESERVE SYSTEM, COMPILATION F FEDEA,
STATE, AND TEuRoRIAL STArUTEs RELATING To BRANcH BANKING (1961).
45 The number of bank offices in the cities and suburbs increased, of course, during
this period. Because of the expansion in offices due to de novo branching, the number
of banking alternatives available to customers in many instances became larger despite
the reduction in the number of head offices.4 6 SMIrr, op. cit. supra note 42, at 8.
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area banks operated an average of 7.6 offices per bank. A total of 170
unit banks remained in the metropolitan areas by the middle of 19 64 4
7
In spite of the large number of banks per county and per metro-
politan area, many of the smaller political units have very few or no
banking offices. In 1962, 252 population centers outside of the metro-
politan areas in the state-cities, boroughs, villages and townships-
had only one commercial bank. Of these, 233 centers had populations
of less than 5,000 persons. Five had populations of 15,000 or more.
An additional sixty-nine centers had two banks, fourteen had three
banks and eight had four, five or six banks. No center outside of
metropolitan areas had as many as seven banks and no such center
with a population of less than 5,000 persons had more than two banks.4
While these centers may be served to some extent by banks from
outside of their geographic limits, it is nonetheless true that market
concentration for most banking services in nonmetropolitan areas is
relatively high. One or a very few banks occupy the bulk of the market.
In general, market concentration by metropolitan areas was not so
great, though it is certainly true that geographic and product sub-
markets exist for some banking services within these areas.4 Table
4 shows deposit concentration for Pennsylvania's twelve Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Aside from Altoona, Pittsburgh and
Reading, the levels of concentration tend to be considerably lower than
in the nonmetropolitan areas. In addition, the number of banks in all
of the metropolitan areas is substantially larger.50
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY
OF THE BANKING STRUCTURE
The public concern with efficiency of markets is different from that
of the businesses operating within those markets. For the latter, effi-
ciency is largely a matter of whether the business succeeds in fulfilling
the profit, power and growth aspirations of the owners and managers.
Conventionally, measurement of business efficiency is likely to be ex-
pressed in such terms as profits, rates of return on capital, share of the
market and similar indicators.
Efficiency from the public's point of view relates to the use of
resources in the production of the goods and services which the public
47 1d. Appendix, at 83-87, 98-102.
48This data was obtained from a special tabulation supplied by the Banking
Markets Unit, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
49 Problems in and criteria for the definition of markets and submarkets are
discussed in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
50 SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 28-30.
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demands. Here, measurement of efficiency involves principally the
relations between resource inputs-human effort, capital and land use-
and the resulting output. Lower input per unit of output may be
reflected in lower prices to consumers but, even where it is not, the
minimizing of resource inputs for any one output activity maximizes
the amount of resources available for the production of other goods and
services. The first of these aspects of efficiency-that is, relations
between costs and prices-affects the distribution of income, while the
second affects the total real income available for distribution. Viewed
over time, the public concern with efficient resource use extends to the
adoption of cost-reducing innovations and the production of new and
preferred goods and services.
With respect to commercial banking and banking market structure,
the public interest can be viewed in terms of whether bank services are
being produced at minimal costs, whether cost advantages are trans-
mitted to the public in the form of price advantages and whether the
firms in the markets tend to introduce process and product innovations.
Size of Bank, Form of Bank and Costs
Several empirical studies of relations between size of bank and
costs have been completed in recent years.5 ' None of these studies is
totally unassailable on either conceptual or methodological grounds,
but the preponderance of evidence from the empirical studies, plus evi-
dence from observed market phenomena, suggests the following factual
situation:
1) In terms of total operating expenses per unit measure of
size, or in terms of direct and relevant costs per unit of par-
ticular bank activities, average costs tend to decrease as the
size of bank or level of activity increases up to certain mini-
mum sizes. It seems quite certain that costs fall significantly
as bank size increases up to between $5,000,000 and
$10,000,000 in deposits and costs may continue to fall, though
less significantly, beyond this. It is not known whether these
economies of scale are due to technical factors associated with
the production of banking services or to the possibly better
quality of management and the greater pressures of competi-
tion facing the larger banks.52
51 ALHADEPF, MONOPOLY AND COP-'ITION IN BANKING (1954); GRAlaY, A
STUDY OF SCALE ECONOmIms IN BANKING (1962); Benston, The Cost of Bank
Operations (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago 1964) ; Greenbaum,
Banking Structure and Costs (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity 1964); Benston, Branch Banking and Economies of Scale, 20 J. FINANCE 312
(1965) ; Benston, Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in Banking Operations,
2 NATIONAL BANKING REv. 507 (1965); Horvitz, Economies of Scale in Banking,
in PRIVATE FINANCIAL ISTIrruTI S 1 (1963) ; Schweiger & McGee, supra note 11,
82See authorities cited note 51 supra,
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2) There are positive costs associated with branching per
se. In general, if two banks are of equal deposit size and
one is a unit bank and the other operates two or more offices,
the latter will tend to have higher total costs than will the
former.
3) The costs associated with branch office operations of a
given size are, at least for small sizes and some locations, less
than the costs of operating a unit bank of the same size at the
same location. It is likely that the difference in costs between
unit and branch operations at one location decreases rapidly
as size increases.
The first two of these are consistent with the results of statistical
studies. No study has attempted directly to verify the third and, be-
cause of the nature of the statement and limitations of data, it is doubt-
ful that statistical tests are feasible. Two sorts of market phenomena
do lend credence to the conclusion, however. First, the absorption
of small banks into branching systems requires ipso facto that in each
instance the acquiring bank be willing to pay for the acquired bank an
amount equal to or more than the minimum expected value of con-
tinuing the operations of the acquired bank. Since the acquisition takes
place only when the owners of both the acquired and acquiring bank
believe themselves benefited there is a suggestion that more profits (or
other measures of achievement of relevance to the banks) are available
with the bank operating as a branch than as an independent unit. While
other factors such as stock market imperfections may also be involved,
the bank merger movement itself is consistent with, though not con-
clusive proof of, the contention that branches are sometimes less costly
to operate than are unit banks.
Second, branch offices have been established de novo in locations
and in sizes in which unit banks do not in fact tend to be established.
The frequent occurrence of small branch offices in shopping centers,
transportation terminals and office buildings, and the rarity, if not
absence, of unit banks in similar locations and sizes, also argue that
there are cost advantages for branch operations in some activities.
Size of Bank, Market Structure and Prices
Virtually all theories of market prices conclude that the smaller
the number of firms in a market and the greater the market share of
one or a few large firms, the greater is the likelihood of a high margin
between cost and prices. 4 This tendency is augmented, theoretical
r Benston, Branch Banking and Economies of Scale, 20 J. FINANCE 312 (1965).
54 Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
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considerations suggest, when the customers of the firms are relatively
large in number, uninformed about the market and unable to shop
among alternative sources of supply.
Theory, then, raises questions as to whether the efficiency of larger
banks and of branching might not fail to be passed on to bank cus-
tomers because of these monopolistic influences. These questions would
seem particularly pertinent for such bank services as small business
loans, consumer financing and personal checking account services for
which the demand conditions mentioned are most nearly met.55
Some empirical studies have shown positive relationships between
interest rates charged on business loans and concentration,", while
others of at least equal merit have raised serious questions concerning
the validity of these conclusions.57  Within the cities covered by the
studies, there are complicated interrelationships among size of city,
size of bank, sizes and mixes of loans, interest rates and levels of con-
centration which have made definitive conclusions difficult. High
concentration tends generally to occur in the smaller of these cities, in
which the banks and average loan sizes are typically smaller than is
the case for banks in the largest cities. After regional effects are re-
moved, differences in loan sizes and mixes accounted for, and variation
in rates among banks in given markets considered, the differences in
loan rates sometimes no longer appear to be significantly or directly
associated with bank concentration per se. It is clear, nonetheless, that
on both theoretical and empirical grounds it would be preferable to
find means for obtaining the economies of size and of branching without
simultaneously increasing market concentration.
The problem of concentration is not, however, peculiar to large
banks in large cities. In Pennsylvania, as in other states,5" high
concentration tends to occur more often in the smallest of population
centers in which one or a very few small banks occupy virtually the
entire market. In these, both the smallness of the bank institutions
and the limited alternatives of customers may, indeed, tend to produce
55 For a discussion of the differing market characteristics of various bank services,
see id. at 356-57; Mitchell, Mergers Among Commercial Banks, in PERSPEcrivEs ON
ANTITRUST PoLIcy 225 (Phillips ed. 1965).
56 Edwards, supra note 11; Schweiger & McGee, supra note 11; Kaufman, Bank
Market Structure and Performance: The Evidence From Iowa, 32 SouzuERN Eco-
NOMIC J. 429 (1966).
7 See studies by Flechsig, supra note 11, and Carson & Horvitz, Concentration
Ratios and Competition, 1 NATIONAL BANKING R-v. 105 (1963). It should be noted
that the editorial process for scholarly publications tends to favor the publication of
research which finds statistically "significant" associations among variables in com-
parison with other research dealing with the same variables but in which no "sig-
nificant" association is found. See Tullock, Publication Decisions and Tests of
Significance-A Comment, 54 J. AMERIcAN STATISTICAl. A. 593 (1959).
58 Changes in Banking Structure, 1953-1962, 49 FED. REsERvF BuLL. 1191 (1963).
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higher prices, but this is hardly attributable to the behavior of banks
which are large in absolute terms. Therefore, bank size must be
related to market size in any application of theory.
There is no evidence to suggest that interest rates vary according
to the legal form of the banking institution. In particular, branch
banks have not been shown to have higher loan rates or lower rates
on savings deposits than do unit banks." It is possible-but largely
conjectural with the present state of knowledge-that holding company
banks of the kind found in rural areas of states such as Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana and North Dakota may have somewhat higher service
charges and rates. Holding company banks, however, are typically
small banks and it is difficult to isolate statistically the size effect from
the holding company effect. Moreover, the banks owned by holding
companies may simply be better managed in the sense that they
rationally charge for certain services which small unit banks have
traditionally supplied to customers without charge.
It is also true that banking markets are to a large extent regulated,
partly by public authority60 and partly by the banks themselves."' Both
forms of regulation-whatever their other merits-tend to reduce the
extent to which bank market structure affects market performance.
Aggressive price competition in rates on loans, rates paid on deposits
or service charges has historically been discouraged by private and
public regulation alike.62 Similarly, such forms of nonprice competition
as the granting of risky or exceptionally large loans are discouraged or
prohibited. And again, truly collusive practices are more likely in small
towns where banks are few and personal relations among bankers are
closer than among banks in the larger cities.
Finally, it would appear that discrimination in the granting of
loans and in interest rates charged would occur more among
small town banks than among the larger ones. The close personal
relations between bank customers and small, locally owned banks
reflects but one side of the discrimination. For the established cus-
tomer and friend of the banker, the discrimination is likely to be favor-
59 FLEcHsIG, BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN METROPOLITAN
AREAs 8 (1965).
GOUnited States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 327-30 (1963).
61 On self-regulation, see HODGMAN, COMMERCIAL BANK LOAN AND INVESTMENT
POLICY 120-35 (1963); Horbett, Banking Structure of United States, in BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BANKING STUDIES 87, 106-07 (1941) ; Phillips,
Competition, Confusion and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FINANCE 32 (1964) ; Robinson,
Unit Banking Evaluated, in BANKING AND MONETARY STUDIES 302 (Carson ed.
1963); Wojnilower & Speagle, The Prime Rate, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK, ESSAYS IN MONEY AND CREDIT 47 (1964).
62 See authorities cited note 61 supra. Note, however, that recent policy with
respect to Regulation Q, governing maximum interest on time deposits, has introduced
a strong competitive element. 12 C.F.R. § 217.3 (Supp. 1966).
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able and the championing of the relationship, quite understandable.
For the newcomer, for one who wishes credit to compete with an estab-
lished customer, the discrimination is likely to have adverse effects.
Here, the larger banks with impersonal rules with respect to loans may
be far less discriminatory. None of the several studies of the pricing of
bank services has found that larger banks and branch banks discrim-
inate with respect to rates or the availability of credit in ways less
favorable to the public than is true of smaller unit banks.0
Product Mix, Innovations and Market Structure
There are no authoritative studies relating to differences in prod-
uct-mix and rates of innovating among banks. It is well known that
banks do tend to specialize in certain services, sometimes to the point
of outright exclusion of some, but more often in terms of the relative
mix of services offered.
The New York State Department of Banking and other investi-
gators have attempted to compare branch and unit bank operations.'
It is found to be almost universally true that, in addition to physical
improvements in facilities, the acquisitions of unit banks by branch
banking systems lead to the introduction of previously unoffered serv-
ices and to improvements in management techniques and conditions of
employment. 5 Some of this research has tested consumer attitudes
with respect to the services offered by banks in unit banking, limited
branch banking and statewide branch banking states but few reliable
conclusions concerning consumer preferences can be made."6
Statistical studies of many industries demonstrate a rather gen-
eral tendency for large firms to undertake a greater quantity of re-
search and development work and to be responsible for a relatively
large share of innovations. 7 No such studies show that it is uni-
63 NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, BRANCH BANKING, BANK MERGERS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1964).
64 Ibid.; KREPS, CHARACTER AND COMPErITIVENESS OF LOCAL BANKING: A SUm-
MARY (1964); Wallace, Businessmen and Their Banks: Observations on Interbank
Competition in Six Local Markets (unpublished, undated) ; Wallace, Banking Struc-
ture and Bank Performance: A Case Study of Three Small Market Areas (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia 1965).
65 See Research into Banking Structure and Competition, 50 FE. RESERVE BULL.
1383, 1386-87, 1395-96 (1964).
66Wallace, Businessmen and Their Banks, supra note 64, found in a survey of
business that "North Carolina (state-wide branching) banks were performing more
satisfactorily in the submarket for business loans." The comparison was with unit
banks in West Virginia and limited branching in Virginia.
67 Representative of recent studies are Mansfield, Size of Firm, Market Structure
and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON. 556 (1963) ; Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure,
Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 1097 (1965).
In none of the studies is the cause and effect relationship clear. In particular, it is
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versally true that greater size and concentration lead to more innova-
tions; some suggest a reversal of the relationship after certain limits
have been reached."8 There is no known research of this kind for
banking. Casual observations, nonetheless, are sufficient to demon-
strate that it is not the smallest of banks which account for the intro-
duction of new bank services. They seem to come instead from an
atmosphere of vigorous, nonprice competition among a fairly small
number of relatively large banks whose goals appear to be growth and
larger market shares. Similarly, changes in method of operations,
including the introduction of automatic data processing and the use of
computers, come first in the larger rather than the smaller banks.
In view of the paucity of analytic research in this area, it would
perhaps be presumptuous to assert that larger banks possess innovative
advantages over the smaller ones on the basis of observations alone.
It clearly is not contrary to fact, however, to conclude conversely that
there is simply no evidence that small banks are generally more progres-
sive and render better services than do the large ones.
BANKING MARKET POLICY FOR PENNSYLVANIA
The principal inefficiency in the existing banking market structure
in Pennsylvania is demonstrated in Table 5. The average size of
deposits for the 217 unit banks in nonmetropolitan counties was about
$5,000,000, the very conservative estimate of the minimum size con-
sistent with efficient bank operations. As of June 30, 1964, 141 non-
metropolitan unit banks had deposits of less than $5,000,000. There
were seventy-six nonmetropolitan unit banks with deposits of less than
$3,000,000, and thirty-two with deposits of less than $2,000,000. Only
twenty unit banks outside of metropolitan areas had deposits in excess
of $10,000,000, the less conservative estimate of the minimum efficient
scale.0 9
Of all the nonmetropolitan Pennsylvania counties, only Potter,
Cameron, Sullivan, Fulton, Union and Montour had no branch banks
in addition to the unit banks shown. Because county data on deposit
size do not reveal the size of the branch systems with offices in more
than one county, estimates by county of the size of the nonmetropolitan
branch banks cannot be made. Many, however, must themselves be
not known whether firms which successfully innovate grow more rapidly than do
others and, hence, tend to be large or whether large size is a necessary condition for
successful innovation in some industries. It is clear that size alone is not a sufficient
condition for relatively high rates of innovation.
68 Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 67 (1965).
69This data is compiled from RAND McNA.Y, INTENATIONAL BANKERS Di-
Racroay (Rand McNally ed. 1964).
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relatively small banks. It is in these areas of the state that the "one-
bank towns" are found. Cameron County has but one commercial
bank office; Forest, Sullivan, Fulton and Montur counties have two
bank offices. All the other counties have five or more offices, but many
communities in them have none or only one office.
It is apparent, of course, that one of the reasons for towns with no
banks or with only one bank is that the market for banking services is
simply too small to support a larger number of even the most efficiently
operated bank organizations. Where this is true efficiency require-
ments would dictate that no additional facilities be located in these
centers. It seems also true, however, that in the counties and towns
with one or more unit banks of very small size, efficiency requirements
would dictate that they be operated as branches of a larger system in
many instances. That this has not transpired under the present code
is testimony to the fact that, with that code, banking competition has
not been active enough to force banks of less than optimum efficiency
to alter their organization, improve their management or to fail.'
It should be noted that the same inability of competition to force
the exit or combination of small unit banks has prevailed, though to a
lesser extent, in the metropolitan areas. Table 6 shows the number of
unit banks and the average deposit size of these banks for metropolitan
areas. While the average size of these banks is more than half again
that of banks in nonmetropolitan counties, some smaller than optimum
banks-perhaps nearly one hundred-remain in the metropolitan areas
even after the numerous mergers of the past fifteen years. The Johns-
town and Reading areas seem particularly to have missed the type of
bank combinations which would have eliminated small unit banks. And
Reading, it may be recalled, has a high level of market concentration.
The efficiency criterion, while of primary economic importance,
is not sufficient for policy purposes. To the extent that it is possible to
accomplish, the goal should be an efficient bank structure which at the
same time preserves (or makes possible) competition, alternative
sources of bank services for customers and the pricing of bank services
in a nonmonopolistic way. The present Pennsylvania code, while per-
missive of efficiency gains through intra-county and contiguous
county bank mergers, fails to permit these gains in the manner most
consistent with the preservation of competition.
The essential weakness of Pennsylvania's geographically limited
branching law is that only those mergers which reduce the number of
banks within given market areas are permitted. Mergers between
70 See Phillips, supra note 61.
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banks from different areas which would not reduce the number of bank-
ing alternatives in either area are largely prohibited.7' Thus, for ex-
ample, the code allows mergers of banks within, say, the Philadelphia
or Pittsburgh or Scranton areas and it permits mergers of banks within,
say, McKean or Forest or Sullivan counties or the contiguous counties.
It prohibits a Philadelphia, Pittsburgh or Scranton bank from acquir-
ing banks in McKean, Forest or Sullivan counties and prohibits a
Philadelphia bank from acquiring a Scranton bank, a Scranton bank
from acquiring a Pittsburgh bank, etc.
Paradoxically, it is these prohibited forms of branching which may
be most consistent with maintaining (and increasing) competition while
at the same time permitting the achievement of economies of scale and
of branching. The possibility that a Philadelphia bank might enter
the Pittsburgh market via the acquisition of one of the many small
unit banks in the latter is a far more effective constraint on the market
power of the few large Pittsburgh banks than is the possible con-
solidation of the small Pittsburgh banks. The latter would increase
concentration and reduce alternatives available to bank customers in
Pittsburgh; the former would not directly affect concentration or the
number of alternatives in the Pittsburgh market and would add an
element of inter-regional competition among Pennsylvania's large banks.
In the same way, the permission of acquisitions of small country
banks by metropolitan area branching systems is conducive to the
inhibition of local monopolistic influences stemming from local unit
banks or local branching system banks. It is precisely this sort of
acquisition which is most likely to bring to smaller communities the
wider services and, sometimes, the lower cost and lower priced services
of city banks which have, in general, a more competitive market environ-
ment in the areas in which their head offices are located.
These arguments apply-though with somewhat less force--to the
so-called "trade area" or "regional branch banking" and to the
"Virginia Plan" types of branching limitations. 72 In the former, a
state is divided into a few largely arbitrarily drawn regions and
mergers are permitted within but not among them. In the latter, state-
wide branching by merger is permitted, but de novo branching is
restricted to the main office city or county.
Applied to Pennsylvania, "trade area" branching would largely
prohibit the potential competition which may arise from the interface
71 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904(b) (Supp. 1965).
7 2 The regional branching scheme is well illustrated by the New York structure.
See N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 3, 105, 600, 601; Comment, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 218 (1966).
The "Virginia Plan" is exemplified by the banking statutes of that state. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-.39 (1966).
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of branches of larger banks from different metropolitan areas. A
Philadelphia bank, for example, could in no circumstances compete
through branching with a Pittsburgh bank in any section of the state.
Depending on the number and configuration of the areas, the possibly
beneficial effects of inter-regional competition would thus be precluded
and protection would be afforded to large banks from competition with
other large banks.
The "Virginia Plan" for branching does not prevent this kind of
competition, but rather tends to shelter small banks by preventing office
proliferation by the branching systems. Here the weakness is that the
economies of small-scale branch offices and the convenience to the public
of more branch locations are denied. With the existing large number
of small unit banks, the encouragement of rural area branching rather
than its restriction would appear to be the more appropriate policy for
Pennsylvania.
This is not to say that branching should be entirely unrestricted.
The above examples have purposely been chosen to demonstrate "pro-
competitive" effects of wider branching. It is quite possible-indeed,
likely-that completely unrestrained bank mergers could lead to the
development of a concentrated statewide banking structure which would
be unjustified by scale economies and inconsistent with competition.
There is, for example, little reason to suspect that the joining of the
largest bank in one metropolitan area with that of another area would
create scale economies. There is ample reason to suspect that a number
of such mergers would reduce inter-regional competition.
It is similarly desirable to avoid unwarranted metropolitan bank
concentration. It may be contended that further mergers among
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh banks are necessary in order that Penn-
sylvania have banks as large as those in other major financial centers.
Some large borrowers located within the state have recourse to larger
banks in New York and other cities. Because of this, the possibility
of mergers among banks of a given metropolitan area has obvious
appeal from the point of view of these banks, since business is being lost
to other banks.
The social merits of permitting bank mergers for this purpose are
not clear. The performance of the national market for large com-
mercial loans is unlikely to be influenced perceptibly by the entrance
of one or two Pennsylvania banks. It is a market generally regarded
as adequately competitive and with growing sources of funds outside of
commercial banking. In addition, there is little evidence that large
borrowers are in fact inconvenienced by having to rely on banks in
other cities. "Shopping" for large loans is not uncommon and the
1967]
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incremental costs to borrowers of contacting banks in other cities are
probably negligible. It is undemonstrated and likely undemonstrable
that the industrial growth of the state is in any appreciable way ad-
versely affected by the absence of multi-billion dollar commercial banks.
Finally, larger banks which arose from mergers among banks which,
prior to merger, were not in a competitive relationship would be as
efficacious in competing in the market for large loans as would those
which result in a lessening of competition in local markets.
POLIcY CONCLUSIONS
Branching and Mergers
These considerations suggest that the provisions in the Penn-
sylvania code with respect to branching should be amended in the
following ways:
1) The provisions preventing de novo branching and branch-
ing by merger outside the county and contiguous counties of
head offices " should be eliminated. Changes in other criteria
to be applied in the approval of mergers are discussed below.
2) While section 1604 " now requires that, among other
things, the Department ascertain the "potential effect of the
merger or consolidation on competition," the code should be
further amended to give primacy to the competitive test.
More specifically:
(a) The code should indicate that sections 103 (a) and
103(b) , which establish that the Department should
act to provide for the "safe and sound conduct" of banks,
the "conservation of their assets," the "protection of the
interests of their . . . shareholders" and "the interest of
the public in the soundness and preservation of the bank-
ing system," should not be interpreted in a manner which
negates the interests of the public in an efficient and com-
petitive banking system. It is certain that increased com-
petition would indeed pose some threat to the safety of
individual institutions and to their shareholders. It is
just this threat which is required if the market is to
induce greater efficiency. Literally applied, these stand-
ards would prevent those mergers which are most directly
in the public interest.
(b) The "need" criterion of section 905(c) 7" with re-
spect to de novo branches and the "convenience and
73 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, 2 904 (Supp. 1965).
74 PA. STAT. ANN. fit 7, § 1604 (Supp. 1965).
75 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 103(a), (b) (Supp. 1965).
76 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 905 Cc) (Supp. 1965).
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needs" criterion of section 1604 77 for mergers and con-
solidations should be deleted. In some circumstances,
"convenience and needs" might be used to prevent
mergers or branches which promise beneficial public
effects but which are likely adversely to affect existing
banks not party to the plans. In other circumstances,
"convenience and needs" arguments might be used to
permit mergers or branches the effects of which are likely
to be strongly anticompetitive .78  In any circumstances,
the "convenience and needs" test is difficult to compre-
hend and it approaches the fictitious when applied.
(c) The preference given in section 905(b) "7 to state-
chartered banks for the establishment of branches in their
own areas should be eliminated. This, together with
the contiguous county branching rule,80 is indicative of
the protection against competition which the current
code affords.
(d) With these changes, section 1604(a) (iv) 81 could
be reduced to an instruction that the Department should
ascertain whether "the merger or consolidation would be
consistent with the public interest on the basis of . .
the potential effect of the merger or consolidation on
competition." The assessment of potential competitive
effects necessarily involves findings with respect to the
financial history of the merging banks, of their prospects
and of their management. Further-and most impor-
tant-such language makes the competitive test clearly
paramount in the Department's considerations. With
any effort at conscientious application, the test would
make it more difficult for banks to expand within
narrow economic areas than is currently the case. Simi-
larly, conscientious application would make it difficult
to justify the merging together of any of the state's
largest banks. The test would not, on the other hand,
prevent the merging together of small banks which had
not had competitive relations with one another nor, in
many cases, the entry of large banks into new markets
through the acquisition of small banks in those markets.
The changes which are suggested with respect to mergers would
to some extent cause an overlap between state and federal policies.
Federal antitrust policy, as enunciated in United States v. Philadelphia
77 PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 7, § 1604 (Supp. 1965).
78 It should be noted that the Bank Merger Act of 1966 now incorporates a
"convenience and needs" test. 80 Stat. 7.
79 PA. STAT. Ax. tit. 7, § 905(b) (Supp. 1965).
8O PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904 (Supp. 1965).
81 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 7, § 1604(a) (iv) (Supp. 1965).
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National Bank 82 and United States v. First National Bank & Trust
Co.,"3 is clearly applicable to mergers between major banks in any
metropolitan area. 4 The same policy and that which has arisen under
the 1960 Bank Merger Act ' would very probably also prevent the
merger of major banks from separate metropolitan areas in the same
state where the resulting bank would be large relative to other banks
in the same state. Thus for such mergers, the proposed competitive
criterion may be employed by the federal antitrust or banking agencies
whether or not it is incorporated in state policies.
The federal agencies are less apt to prevent mergers when the
banks and the relevant market areas involved in a merger are smaller.
For this reason, state policy becomes the crucial determinant for bank
mergers for a major segment of the state's banking industry. Further-
more, while metropolitan banks are in absolute terms the largest, it is
also true that they typically operate in markets which are more competi-
tive than the markets outside of metropolitan areas. State policy, that is,
is likely to remain the main vehicle for establishing and maintaining
competition in the very areas in which the competitive problem is most
acute. It would be a mistake of major proportions to believe that
federal antitrust policy preempts the entire field.
Holding Companies
With these changes in branching provisions, it is doubtful that
any holding company could achieve the same economies of operation as
would a branch system. Holding companies appear almost entirely
in states in which branching is prohibited or where the limitations on
branching provide special opportunities for holding company operations.
In Virginia, for example, the prohibition of additional branching within
a county in which a bank has been acquired has favored the growth of
holding companies along with the development of statewide branching
by merger.
That holding companies are unable to duplicate the economies of
branching operations is in part inherent in their organization. The
individual corporations remain and much of the pooling and specializa-
tion of tasks possible with a branch system are impossible with the
holding company. 6 In particular, each holding company bank is sub-
82 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (§ 7 Clayton Act violation).
83 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (§ 1 Sherman Act violation).
84 This policy may, of course, be somewhat modified by the 1966 bank merger
legislation. 80 Stat. 7.
85 74 Stat 129.
86 For a generally concurring view, see FIscHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
(1961). For a more favorable view of holding companies, see NADLER & BOGEN, THE
BANK HOLDING COMPANY (1959). The latter reference does not, however, argue
that holding companies are as efficient as branch banking.
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ject to the requirements and regulations relative to unit banks. Further,
those holding companies qualifying under the federal Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 17 are forbidden to make "upstream loans" within
their system. "Downstream loans" and loan participations are regu-
lated by the Board of Governors. s Correspondent relations are fre-
quently more convenient when loan participations are necessary.
It does not follow that the Pennsylvania Bank Holding Company
Act should be repealed. It is quite possible that, where mergers among
banks might be prohibited because of anticompetitive effects, holding
companies might appear as an alternative. Some banks might also be
willing to be a part of a holding company while unwilling to merge
because of the retention of local identity and local officers in the holding
company organization. It appears, then, that the present law prohibit-
ing this device should be retained.
It should be recognized, nonetheless, that neither the federal nor
the state law necessarily accomplishes all of its avowed purposes. The
25% ownership rule does not prevent control based on a smaller
percentage of ownership. Informal "chain bank" ownership by non-
corporate entities may accomplish the same end as do holding com-
panies. Further, since the ownership or control of two or more banks
is necessary to violate the law, those fraudulent transactions which can
be arranged through the ownership or control of a single bank are not
prevented."'
Chartering
The entry of new banks into markets through chartering creates
the same restraint on monopolistic influences as does entry through
inter-market branching. In the case of chartering, it can be argued that
the competitive effect is even greater since an additional alternative for
bank customers is created. For the same reasons that inter-market
branching was argued to be desirable, it can be and has been contended
that entry by chartering should be facilitated.'
While mergers tend to increase the average size of banks, to
reduce the number of banks and-where the minimum efficient scale
does not exist-to achieve scale economies, the possible proliferation
of small banks through unrestricted chartering moves in exactly the
opposite direction if bank disappearances are not simulanteously per-
mitted. Accordingly, it is concluded that if the changes suggested with
87 70 Stat. 133 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1964).
88 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1964).
S9 See Hall, Bank Holding Company Regulation, 31 SOUTHEN ECONOmIC J.
342 (1965).
90 Alhadeff, A Reconsideration of Restrictions on Bank Entry, 76 Q.J. EcoN,
246 (1962).
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respect to mergers and branching were adopted, the criteria for charters
should also be amended to facilitate newly organized banking
institutions.
The most reasonable amendment would allow far from completely
unrestrained entry. The existing minimum capital requirements are
not so large that they erect a formidable barrier. Indeed, if scale
economies do extend to banks of $5,000,000 or $10,000,000 in deposits,
the present capital requirements permit the establishment of banks of
substantially less than optimum scale.9 The existence of the require-
ments does, however, prevent banks from being established on the basis
of the mere caprice of an organizer and for this reason alone their
retention seems desirable.
It is also reasonable that the Department of Banking should inquire
into the intentions of bank organizers for the purpose of preventing
fraud. Both the depositors and the subscribing shareholders of a new
bank require this "blue sky law" type of protection. Similarly, the
chartering agency should investigate the prospects of a new bank grow-
ing to such size as will be efficient within the proposed market.
9 2
If these are the only considerations in chartering, entry would be
considerably easier than under the current "convenience and needs of
the public" standard.93 The latter, as typically interpreted by charter-
ing agencies, is an extraordinarily ambiguous concept which in applica-
tion reduces to preferences for and protection of the existing banks in
a market. It is in this respect that chartering should be made less
difficult. If a proposed new bank meets the capital requirements, if its
organizers have the legitimate purpose of attempting profitably to
operate a commercial bank and if there are reasonable prospects of
success, charters should be granted even if success for the new bank
implies loss of business and the likely disappearance of banks currently
occupying the market. The relaxed merger standards would afford a
means for the less successful banks-whether new or old ones-to
disappear without a public crisis and with losses occurring only to the
owners of inefficient enterprises. In these circumstances, the easier
entry provisions would be effective in forestalling both monopolistic in-
fluences and in preventing gross operating inefficiencies.
Entry, it should be emphasized, can prevent neither monopoly nor
inefficiency if every bank, once established, has its existence preserved
by regulation. It is essential, if both ends are to be achieved, that any
changes making chartering less restrictive be accompanied by the
91 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1102 (Supp. 1965) ; authorities cited note 51 sapra.
9 2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 7, § 1007 (Supp. 1965) so provides.
93 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1007(a)(ii) (Supp. 1965).
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possibility of failing banks' being acquired by banks outside of their
own market area.
A POSTSCRIPT
These conclusions will surely appear radical to many bankers. On
the one hand, the existence of a large number of small banks-mostly
in rural areas but some in cities as well-would be less secure than
it currently is. That is a necessary cost of attaining greater efficiency.
On the other hand, the possible emergence of a few large banks
dominating city banking markets and possibly the entire state is to be
avoided. It was indicated in the introduction that the conclusions of
this article would be on the impact of the banking structure on the
"commonweal." This, it is felt, would be better served with the recom-
mended changes. It is quite apparent that, to gain efficiencies, the
number of banks in the state would continue to be reduced were the
recommendations followed. It is equally apparent, however, that the
past trend toward concentration in the distinguishable markets for
services such as small business loans, consumer loans and small business
and personal deposit services would be less strong than under the
present code.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 194










1950-1964 978 11 367 1 -357
TABLE 295
CHANGES IN THE NuMBER OF BRANCHES OPERATED BY COMmERCIAL BANKS
IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1950-1964
Number of Branches Branches Opened,
at Beginning of Converted or Branches Net
Year Period Replaced Closed Change
1950 181 12 - +12
1951 193 27 - +27
1952 220 39 3 +36
1953 256 60 2 +58
1954 314 86 4 +82
1955 396 83 8 +75
1956 471 72 5 +67
1957 538 62 4 +58
1958 596 77 2 +75
1959 671 71 2 +69
1960 740 58 5 +53
1961 793 82 1 +81
1962 874 76 3 +73
1963 947 104 3 +101
1964 1,048
1950-1964 181 907 42 +867
9 Source: Unpublished compilations by Banking Markets Unit, Board of Gov-
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TABLE 3 96
NUMBER OF BANKS IN METROPOLITAN AREA COUNTIES AND IN
NONmETROPOLITAN ARA_ COUNTIES, 1956 AND 1964
Number of Banks 
9 7
Area and County August 31,1956 June 30,1964
Metropolitan Areas:












































96Source: JOINT STATE GovERNmENT CoMM'N, BRANcH BANKING (1957);
P. SmrrH, BANs AND OTHER FiNANCiAL INSTITUTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1965).
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
NUMBER OF BANKS IN METROPOLITAN AREA COUNTIES AND IN
NONmTROPOLITAN AREA COUNTIES, 1956 AND 1964
Number of Banks 
9 7













































Total-Metropolitan Areas 442 299
Total-Nonmetropolitan Areas 365 310
Total-All Areas 807 609





PERCENT OF ToTA. DosrIs HE= By LARGEST BANKS WITH HEAD OrICEs
iN METROPOLITAN AREAS OF PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 30, 1962
Metropolitan Area
Percent of Total Deposits













98 Source: Banking Markets Unit.
99 Includes three New Jersey Counties,
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TABLE 5 100
NUMBER AND AVERAGE SIZE OF UNIT BANKS IN COUNTIES OUTSIDE
OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 30, 1964
Average Deposit
Area and Number of Size of Unit Banks
County Unit Banks (millions of dollars)
Northwestern 19 $5.2







































100 Source: Banking Markets Unit.
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
NUMBER AND AVERAGE SIZE OF UNIT BANKS IN COUNTIES OUTSIDE
OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 30, 1964
Average Deposit
Area and Number of Size of Unit Banks
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TABLE 6 101
NUMBER AND AVERAGE SIZE OF UNrr BANKS IN METROPOLITAN
AREAs IN PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 30, 1964
Average Deposit
Number of Size of Unit Banks
Metropolitan Area Unit Banks (millions of dollars)












All Metropolitan Area Unit Banks 170 7.6
101 Ibid.
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